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Introduction 
The Kingdom of Bhutan is often described as being physically 
small with limited economic scope and military might. In spite 
of these limitations, Bhutan has earned the reputation of 
being a peaceful country where the development of threats 
from militancy, terrorism, and economic disparity within itself 
has virtually been absent. In this sense, Bhutan has thus far 
been more fortunate than many of its neighbours in the 
South Asian region. 
 
This has been in part owing to its self-isolationist policy up 
until the second half of the 20th century, and the preservation 
and promotion of a strong sense of identity that has ensured 
social cohesion and unity.  Having never been colonized, nor 
feeling any direct impact of two world wars and the cold war, 
Bhutan has been spared the conflicts and turmoil such as 
that of the legacy of hatred and mistrust generated by the 
partition of British India into present-day India and Pakistan.  
 
Nevertheless, Bhutanese have historically been sensitive to 
issues of security with frequent disturbance occurring from 
internal warring factions prior to unification and 
establishment of the monarchy in 1907. External threat was 
present during the 17th and 18th centuries with several failed 
attempts at invasion from the Tibetans; 19th century Bhutan 
saw the loss of the Assam and Bengal Duars to British India.1 
As such, preserving its sovereign independence and territorial 
integrity has always been a matter of great importance for 
Bhutan.  
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By the early half of the 20th century, developments in the 
Himalayan region prompted Bhutan to re-evaluate the 
usefulness of its isolationist policy. Within this context, 
Bhutan began to develop political orientation towards its 
southern neighbour - nurturing a close relationship with 
India was one way of enhancing its own territorial security 
while at the same time enhancing the prospects for 
socioeconomic development. As for India with its contentious 
state of relations with China, Bhutan’s strategic location 
between the two ensured the service of a buffer state that 
could enhance its own security.  
 
The initiation of Indo-Bhutan friendship as it stands today, is 
credited to the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Pandit 
Jawahalal Nehru and His Majesty Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, 
the third King of Bhutan. Their meeting in the 1950s sparked 
the dialogue for development cooperation. Looking back over 
the decades since then, and under the continued guidance of 
the present king His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, 
Indian assistance has greatly expanded in every field of 
Bhutan’s development and socioeconomic growth. To this day, 
India continues to provide the largest and most diverse 
assistance to Bhutan among all other donors. Often cited as a 
“shining” example of friendship and cooperation between a 
large country and a small neighbour, relations between the 
two continue to grow at all levels.  
 
I.   A Background on Indo-Bhutan Relations 
Recorded historic relations between Bhutan and India date 
back to 747 A.D., when the great Indian saint 
Padmasambhava introduced Buddhism in Bhutan, which has 
since then permeated all aspects of Bhutanese life. Aside from 
such shared cultural and religious heritage, other areas of 
interaction developed during the British rule in India, which 
include several Anglo-Bhutanese skirmishes and battles that 
were consequently followed by treaties and agreements. It was 
within this period of interaction with the British that trade 
between Bhutanese and Indians was also recorded to have 
taken place for the first time (1873). 
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China’s invasion of Tibet (1910-12) and subsequent claims 
made on Bhutan resulted in the signing of the Treaty of 
Punakha in 1910 with British India. Although this treaty 
served to expel any claims that China might have tried to 
make, it did not define Bhutan’s status technically or legally; 
for the Bhutanese, this was a source of uncertainty over its 
relations with India at the time that the British rule was 
nearing an end. After India’s independence in 1947, 
‘standstill agreements’ with Sikkim, Nepal and Tibet were 
signed to continue existing relations until new agreements 
were made; for Bhutan, its status became clearer following 
Nehru’s invitation for a Bhutanese delegation to participate in 
the Asian Relations Conference in 1947. Following this, the 
negotiation for a fresh Indo-Bhutan Treaty started in the 
summer of 1949.  
 
The basis for bilateral relations between India and Bhutan is 
formed by the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, which provides for, 
among others, “perpetual peace and friendship, free trade and 
commerce and equal justice to each other’s citizens.”2 The 
much speculated Article 2 in the Treaty, in principle, calls for 
Bhutan to seek India’s advice in external matters, while India 
pledges non-interference in Bhutan’s internal affairs.  
 
The geopolitical scene in the entire Himalayan region and 
Indian sun-continent underwent great change following the 
proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and 
the takeover of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950. 
These events, plus the presence of Chinese troops near 
Bhutan’s border, the annexation of Bhutanese enclaves in 
Tibet and Chinese claims all led Bhutan to re-evaluate its 
traditional policy of isolation; the need to develop its lines of 
communications with India became an urgent necessity. 
Consequently, Bhutan was more inclined to develop relations 
with India, and the process of socioeconomic development 
began thereafter with Indian assistance. For India’s own 
security too, the stability of Himalayan states falling within its 
strategic interest was a crucial factor to consider. With border 
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tensions between India and China escalating into military 
conflict in 1962, India could not afford Bhutan to be a weak 
buffer state.  
 
Based on this backdrop, Indo-Bhutan relations began to take 
on concrete form following state visits made by the third king, 
His Majesty Jigme Dorji Wangchuck to India, and by Prime 
Minister Jahawalal Nehru to Bhutan between 1954 to 1961. 
Besides emphasizing India’s recognition of Bhutan’s 
independence and sovereignty in his public statement in Paro, 
Nehru’s visit in 1958 was also significant with discussions 
initiated for development cooperation between the two 
countries.  
 
Formal bilateral relations between Bhutan and India were 
established in January 1968 with the appointment of a 
special officer of the Government of India to Bhutan. The 
India House (Embassy of India in Bhutan) was inaugurated 
on May 14, 1968 and Resident Representatives were 
exchanged in 1971. Ambassadorial level relations began with 
the upgrading of residents to embassies in 1978. 
 
Beginning with India, Bhutan began to diversify its relations 
in the international community, thereby projecting its status 
as an independent and sovereign nation. With India 
sponsoring Bhutan’s application for UN membership in 1971, 
the leaders of the two countries demonstrated that Article 2 of 
the Indo-Bhutan Treaty was not a restricting factor in the 
exercise of Bhutan’s foreign policy.  
 
II.  Areas of Cooperation 
Development Assistance and Economic Relations 
Planned development in Bhutan began in 1961, with the first 
two Five Year Plans (FYP) wholly financed by the Government 
of India (GOI). Over the years, Indian assistance has 
increased steadily from Rs. 107 million in the First FYP to Rs. 
9000 million in the Eighth FYP. Road construction by the 
Indian Border Roads Organization started in the first FYP 
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(1962-66); the second FYP (1966-71) focused on public works, 
education, agriculture and health. While Bhutan’s source of 
foreign aid has diversified significantly since it became a 
member of the United Nations, India continues to be the 
major donor of external aid to Bhutan - Indian assistance 
accounted for about 41 percent of total external outlay during 
the 8th FYP (1997-2002). Over the last four decades, India has 
provided assistance mainly in the social sectors such as 
education and human resource development, health, 
hydropower development, agriculture, and roads. In addition, 
India also provides partial or full grant assistance and 
gradually, economic relations have evolved with cooperation 
extending towards mutually beneficial projects such as in 
hydropower development and industrial projects. 
 
These projects are taken up outside of the FYP programmes 
with many major works awarded to Indian companies. 
Important projects invested in under Government of India-
Royal Government of Bhutan (GOI-RGOB) cooperation 
include the Chhukha (336MW), Kurichhu (60MW), and Tala 
(1020MW) Hydro Power Projects; the Penden and Dungsam 
Cement Projects; and the Paro Airport Project. A 
Memorandum of Understanding for preparing a detailed 
project report for the proposed 870 MW Puna Tsangchhu 
Hydropower Project was also signed between the two 
governments in September 2003. With the huge Indian 
market for electricity currently facing domestic supply 
difficulties,  Bhutan has high potential to offer supply relief to 
India – presently, approximately ninety percent of electricity 
generated in Bhutan is exported to India, and this only 
translates to 0.5 of the total demand. Other mutual benefits 
generated by the Indian assisted and Bhutanese government 
owned projects include assured business opportunities in the 
manufacturing and other industries in both India and Bhutan.  
 
Trade and Investment  
A new era in Bhutan’s foreign trade commenced following the 
closure of trade routes between Bhutan and Tibet in 1960, 
and the construction of roads linking the Bengal-Assam 
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plains to Phuentsholing, and Phuentsholing to Thimphu and 
Paro in 1962.  
 
Over the period of 1981-2001, Bhutan’s exports to India 
accounted for an average of 86.5 percent of its exports, and 
imports from India accounted for an average 79 percent of the 
total imports. Bhutan’s main items for export to India are 
electricity, mineral products, product of chemical industries, 
base metals and products, and wood and wood products with 
hydropower generation being the most important area of 
comparative advantage. Imports from India include a wide 
range of items including machinery, mechanical appliances, 
base metals, electronic items, foodstuff and other basic 
necessities and consumer items.  
 
Besides trade, Indian involvement extends into many other 
areas of Bhutan’s private and public sector activities. In the 
area of Foreign Direct Investment, Bhutan has so far pursued 
a conservative policy, and the first and only foreign investor 
in Bhutan for almost two decades since 1971 was the State 
Bank of India (SBI). The SBI has worked in collaboration with 
the Bank of Bhutan (BOB) since its identification as partner 
in management and share holding in the capital of BOB, in 
addition to imparting banking expertise. BOB’s collaboration 
with SBI was last renewed on January 1, 2002 for a period of 
up to December 31, 2006.  
 
In addition, Indian nationals operate a range of small-scale 
trading and service activities on licenses issued by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry in Bhutan. Such ventures 
include small shops trading in a variety of products like 
grocery, auto parts and furniture, as well as scrap dealers, 
distribution and dealership agencies. Indians in Bhutan also 
run hotels/restaurants, saloons, tailoring and cobbler 
services. On a larger scale, Indian investment in Bhutan 
exists in the manufacturing and processing industries, 
construction, service, engineering, steel and electronic 
industries, and consultancy. Indian companies such as the 
Jaiprakash Industries and NHPC carry out major works for 
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the Tala and Kurichhu Power Projects respectively. Similarly, 
many other Indian and Bhutanese companies (or joint 
ventures) benefit from the current requirements of massive 
power projects and manufacturing industries.  
 
Although there is no in-depth study available on the level of 
informal trade between the two, it has been noted3 that such 
activities are tolerated in practice partly because of the open 
and porous border between Bhutan and India. Another 
informal but common practice is the operation of a wide 
range of businesses by Indian persons using the licenses of 
Bhutanese nationals as indigenous fronts. These include 
anything from small shops trading in petty consumer items to 
large-scale investment businesses such as construction.  
 
The prevalence of small-scale Indian investment as well as 
business fronting is understandably concentrated in southern 
Bhutan owing to proximity of bordering Indian towns. The 
border town of Phuentsholing is the center of commercial hub 
in the country from where the exit and entry of goods as well 
as travelers largely takes place; the Indian town Jaigoan 
under Jaipalguri district is “just across the fence” where 
tailor-made foods suited to Bhutanese needs are especially 
stocked.  Although statistics are not available, it is apparent 
that the business community in Jaigoan has prospered in 
large part owing to the level of trading activities with 
Bhutanese businessmen and other customers. (CBS et al: 
2004, pp 79-189). 
 
Labour Relations  
Beginning with the inception of development plans in the 
1960s, Bhutan’s requirement of semi-skilled and unskilled 
labour has been filled in by expatriates, particularly Indians, 
first in road construction and then in other sectors such as 
mining, agro-based industries and hydropower projects with 
the shift in development priorities. This dependence sprung 
from the lack of in-country experience and skills in road 
construction as well as technical skills and equipment. Indian 
personnel and labourers were recruited in large numbers, 
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mainly from neighbouring Indian states. While Indian 
labourers found employment on Bhutanese roads, Bhutanese 
labourers (who were mostly farmers) were spared the sole 
brunt of undertaking the construction works. Currently, the 
public road maintenance is entrusted mainly to Project 
Dantak4, and at any given time it has an average 2000 Indian 
labourers working on roads in various parts of Bhutan.  
 
Considering that the modern system of formal education in 
Bhutan was initiated only after 1955, and that it was a few 
decades before the first generation of qualified Bhutanese 
entered the civil service, many Indian personnel were 
recruited by the Bhutanese government to fill in 
administrative posts and others related to development 
programmes in the 1960s. While Bhutanese nationals have 
gradually replaced Indians in these posts, many continue to 
serve in both public corporations and the civil service to this 
day.5 However, a turning point has come where the successes 
of modern education have helped to gradually replace Indian 
expatriates in various professions such as teaching, health 
and medics, engineering, accounting and administration.    
  
Additional Areas of Cooperation  
India’s assistance towards Bhutan’s security and defense 
arrangements, specifically in training and equipping the Royal 
Bhutan Army, was prompted by several factors that include 
Bhutan’s location in India’s strategic defense system, the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet, the 1962 border war between 
India and China and perception of increasing Chinese threat. 
Besides training and courses for army personnel conducted 
by the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in the past, 
Bhutanese army cadets continue to be sent to the National 
Defense Academy (NDA) in Pune, and the Indian Military 
Academy (IMA) in Dehra Dun, India.  The presence of IMTRAT 
can be seen when one travels between the districts of Paro, 
Haa and Thimphu in western Bhutan. The headquarters of 
the IMTRAT in Bhutan is located in Haa District, which is 
adjacent to Tibet’s Chumbi valley. Its establishment in 
Thimphu includes the Friendship Hospital, locally called the 
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IMTRAT hospital, which offers invaluable services to 
Bhutanese patients as well. In addition to building schools 
and hospitals in the country, an important defense 
consideration has been the construction of extensive roads by 
India’s Border Roads Organization, called Project DANTAK in 
Bhutan.  
 
The benefits of Indo-Bhutan relations are also prominent in 
other areas such as education and culture where there is a 
high level of interaction. The Indian government provides 
about fifty scholarships annually to Bhutanese students for 
their higher studies in India. A significant number of Indian 
teachers contribute to education in Bhutan with many of 
them posted to teach in remote areas in Bhutan. In addition, 
Sherubtse College in eastern Bhutan has developed into a 
premier institution for tertiary education in Bhutan with its 
affiliation to the Delhi University in India. The exchange of 
cultural troupes and artists between Bhutan and India has 
also become a regular activity under the bilateral cultural 
exchange programme. In 2001 a cultural exhibition titled, 
“The Living Religious and Cultural Traditions of Bhutan” was 
hosted by the Indian government at New Delhi and Kolkata; 
consequently, a six-month Festival of India was held in 
Bhutan from June to November 2003 – the main purpose of 
these initiatives has been to strengthen the ties of friendship, 
and to create awareness among the people of the many areas 
of commonalities between the two countries. 
 
Other areas of cooperation include bilateral civil aviation 
dating back to 1983 when Bhutan’s national airline Druk Air, 
began commercial operations to India with flights from Paro 
to Calcutta and later from Paro to Delhi in 1988. An Air 
Services Agreement signed with India in September 1991 
granted Druk Air Fifth Freedom Rights; following a new 
commercial agreement in May 1998, these Rights were 
provided on concessional terms. A Government of India 
notification that same year qualified Druk Air to avail of fuel 
at bonded rates, and its fuel continues to be supplied by the 
Indian Oil Company. By 2000, Druk Air was also granted 
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permission to use Bagdogra as a diversionary airport for 
refueling, technical halts and during bad weather conditions. 
With permission from the Department of Civil Aviation in 
India, Druk Air inaugurated flights on the Paro-Bodhgaya 
sector on 11th November 2003, thus offering services to 
Bhutanese making their annual pilgrimages.   
 
In the international fora too, India and Bhutan can be seen to 
be supportive of each other. While Bhutan has not always 
voted identically with India on every issue, thereby expressing 
its own choices, it has maintained a consistent pattern of 
support to India on many occasions and significant issues. To 
name a few, these include the vote on the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the establishment of Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, India’s aspirations to be a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, India’s 
candidature to various international bodies, negotiations in 
the WTO, and the importance of India in the success of 
SAARC. 6 
 
A strong tradition of official visits at various levels has further 
enabled views to be exchanged and areas of cooperation to be 
enhanced between the two countries. Besides everyday 
people-to-people contact at the informal level, ministers, 
parliamentarians, civil servants as well as representatives of 
the business community all make regular official visits. His 
Majesty King Jigme Singye Wangchuck himself has made at 
least fourteen visits to India since 1971, with the most recent 
one being in September 2003.  
 
III.  Some Issues of Concern 
While India and Bhutan share an extraordinarily warm 
friendship, issues such as the state of relations with China 
continue be a cause of some concern to both countries. 
Considering the importance of Bhutan’s economic relations 
with India, the liberalization policies in India and its 
implications for Bhutan is an additional development to take 
into account. More recently, the illegal presence of militants 
using Bhutan as a base and hideout while rebelling against 
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the Indian government resulted in the Bhutanese army taking 
military action to flush out the insurgents.  
 
Relations with China 
In light of the contentious state of Indo-China relations, it is 
no secret that Bhutan with its strategic location figures into 
India’s security interests. Therefore, whatever course Indo-
China relations may follow in the future, it is likely that these 
bear implications for Indo-Bhutan relations as well. While it 
may not be realistic to expect that Indo-China relations will 
normalize in the immediate future, it is not something that 
should be considered impossible over the course of time. 
Some confidence building measures are being taken by both 
sides, for example by discussing the boundary issue, with 
regular exchange of high level visits, and with agreements 
made to enhance cooperation in areas such as culture, trade, 
science and technology. In the long term, normalization in 
Indo-China relations and consequently, the degree to which 
strategic considerations influence India’s policy towards 
Bhutan is a possibility that should be considered. And even 
as current geo-political and geo-economic realities ensure 
that India will continue to be one of the most critical elements 
in Bhutan’s foreign relations, Bhutan has to consider the 
reality of China to its north. As such, Bhutan maintaining 
friendly relations with China without undermining its own 
relations with India is a challenge that deserves careful 
consideration.  
 
India’s liberalization policies 
Up until the 1990s, Bhutan has enjoyed more or less 
protected status in its trade relations with India. With 
economic liberalization on the rise in India, however, Bhutan 
is facing a gradual loss of this status, and unless Bhutanese 
industries are able to remain competitive they could lose their 
market share in the increasingly open market in India. 
Bhutan has already felt the impact of the reform in India’s 
subsidy policies that has resulted in a gradual phasing out of 
subsidies and a decrease in its budget for assistance to 
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Bhutan. Bhutan will also have to face the effects that would 
be brought on by India gradually moving toward privatizing 
its power, petroleum and other traditional public sectors.  
 
Military operations against Indian militants 
Over the last decade or so, the illicit establishment of camps 
by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National 
Democratic Front of Bodos (NDFB) and the Kamtapuri 
Liberation Organization (KLO) militant outfits7 in the dense 
jungles of south-east Bhutan has been a matter of great 
concern and security threat for Bhutan. In addition to 
hampering businesses and the implementation of 
development activities in many parts of the country, the 
presence of these militants was a potential cause of affecting 
the friendly relations enjoyed by Bhutan and India.    
 
In consideration of the close ties between Bhutan and India, 
and recognizing that the militants (despite their actions) are 
nonetheless Indian citizens from the neighbouring states of 
Assam and West Bengal, the Bhutanese government 
repeatedly urged the militants to leave the country peacefully. 
But in spite of the Bhutanese government having spent 
almost six to seven years to find a peaceful solution8 to the 
problem, it was apparent by the last months of 2003 that the 
militants had no real intention of leaving Bhutan until their 
own objectives had been fulfilled9.  
 
In December 2003, with the talks with the ULFA and NDFB 
having failed, and the KLO not even responding, the 
Bhutanese government’s repeated attempts at a peaceful 
solution came to an end. On the morning of 15th December 
2003, the Bhutanese army finally launched military 
operations to flush out the militants. Even as security forces 
took over all thirty of the militants’ camps into the second day 
of offensive, the combing process and the implications of the 
operations have brought forth the reality, that the long spell 
of peace and tranquility that has been the proud inheritance 
of the present Bhutanese generation can no longer be taken 
for granted. (CBS et al: 2004, pp 79-189) 
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Although the operation was considered successful, Bhutan 
has come to realize the need to be wary of possible 
repercussions following such an action. Having long kept the 
military option at bay in consideration of possible retaliation 
against Bhutanese from the militants as well as their relatives 
and supporters from Assam, Bhutanese have recently had to 
be much more cautious than usual while traveling through 
Indian territory.10 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Aware of its small size, lack of advanced technology and 
military defense capabilities, Bhutan has had to rely on 
alternative security measures such as “national identity for 
cultural cohesion, and neutrality to renew its long-term 
security” 11  An added bonus to this strength has been its 
natural location in the Himalayas along the lines of India’s 
strategic security interests, and consequent prospects for 
internal growth.  
 
However, such a location has been a factor not only of 
strength but also its vulnerability.  Being a landlocked, 
mountainous country, Bhutan’s trade routes and access to 
the sea pass through India and it is thus largely dependent 
on the latter for its economic security. While Bhutan has 
diversified its political and economic relations and has 
attained a good level of socio-economic development, the 
reality of its position and shared borders with India means 
that destabilizing elements from external sources continue to 
pose threats to its stability. These have been evident from the 
spillover effects of militancy from Assam, and of cross-border 
economic migration driven by regional poverty.  
 
As the world globalizes and traditional barriers are broken 
down, Bhutan too is being swept into the process. Along the 
way, its traditional strongholds of national identity and 
cultural cohesion will continue to face increasing challenges, 
just as its long spell of internal peace and tranquility was 
challenged by issues manifesting out of regional situations 
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like poverty, economic migration and militancy.  
 
As Bhutanese, however, one can take pride in the fact the 
leadership, in particular the present king, has guided the 
country along a unique development path of its own without 
submitting incorrigibly to external influences. And while the 
illicit presence of the ULFA-NDFB-KLO militants on 
Bhutanese soil was a shared concern of both India and 
Bhutan, Bhutanese leaders were clear on their stand that 
such immediate security threat to its sovereignty would be 
taken in its stride. Thus, the military operations launched by 
the Bhutanese army to flush out the militants in December 
2003 not only provided assurance of Bhutan’s capability to 
safeguard its own security, it was also another commitment 
made toward the maintenance of strong Indo-Bhutan ties.  
 
Ever since Bhutan and India embarked upon the road of 
friendship and cooperation, the two countries have 
demonstrated that a journey of peace and mutual benefit 
between two neighbours can be pursued, even in a region 
where the level of economic disparity, terrorism and conflict is 
high. We can perhaps look at such a relation as a model of 
friendship and cooperation between close neighbours.  
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1 Ura, Karma. 2002. “Perceptions of Security” pp 59-79, in Dipankar 
Banerjee ed., South Asian Security: Futures. Colombo: Regional 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka. 
2 As quoted on the website of the Indian Embassy in Bhutan at 
<http: www.eoithimphu.org/indo.html> 
3 The study on Economic and Political Relations between Bhutan and 
the Neighbouring Countries (CBS et al: 2004) notes that much of the 
informal trade are not considered illegal economic activities, but 
more as ‘extra-legal’ trading; informal trade is described here as 
those that are unregistered, unlicensed, and not recorded by the 
government. 
4 An organization of the Indian Border Roads Organization 
5 In 2002, there were a total of 11,499 Indians working in 30 Indian 
companies undertaking joint ventures in Bhutan. There were also 
734 Indians working in 24 different public corporations. In the civil 
service, Indians number 871 of which 128 are regular employees 
and 734 contract employees. Nearly 84% of them are teachers in 
Bhutanese schools. As of August 2003, the total number of regular 
Indian employees was 32,776. (CBS et al, pp 79-189) 
6 CBS et al, pp 79-189. 
7 The ULFA, fighting for the independence of Assam, NDFB, fighting 
for an independent state of Bodoland, and KLO, fighting for an 
independent state of Kamtapur had an estimated 1560 militants in 
13 camps, 740 militants in 12 camps, and 430 militants in 5 camps 
respectively, as reported by Bhutan’s Home Minister to the 81st 
session of the National Assembly prior to the launch of military 
operations in December 2003.  
8 The issue was deliberated extensively in successive sessions of the 
National Assembly - the 77th session in 1999 passed a three-point 
resolution to make the militants leave peacefully: steps would be 
taken to stop rations and supplies from reaching militant camps; 
any Bhutanese or Indian national helping militants on Bhutanese 
territory would be prosecuted under the National Security Act; and 
the government would hold talks with the leaders of the militants to 
reach a peaceful solution.  
9 Prior to the final round of talks with the militants in December 
2003, the Bhutanese government had held four rounds of talks with 
 128
                                                                                                 
the ULFA, reaching an agreement during the 3rd round that camps 
would be removed and their cardres reduced in phases; however, 
camps were soon relocated and cardre strength increased. In two 
rounds of meeting with the NDFB, they gave no commitment to leave 
Bhutan and thereafter refused to come for further talks; as for the 
KLO, correspondences made by the Bhutanese government to 
remove their camps were flatly ignored, and talks scheduled to be 
held with a high-level delegation was instead attended by junior level 
leaders of the outfit.  
10 Trade routes to at least twelve of twenty districts of Bhutan have 
to pass through Indian territory in Assam.  
11 Quoted from Karma Ura’s “Perceptions of Security” pp 59-79, in 
Dipankar Banerjee ed., South Asian Security: Futures. Colombo: 
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka, 2002. 
